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Abstract
A rich literature in public administration has shown that pub-
lic sector employees have stronger altruistic motivations than private
sector employees. Recent economic theories stress the importance of
mission preferences, and predict that altruistic people sort into the
public sector when they subscribe to its mission. This paper uses
data from a representative survey among more than 30.000 employ-
ees from 50 countries to test this prediction. Our results show that
only those individuals who are willing to contribute to the welfare of
others and, in addition, feel that by working in the public sector they
contribute to a good cause are signicantly more likely to work in the
public sector. Our results are most pronounced for highly educated
employees.
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1 Introduction
Many jobs in the public sector involve tasks that help people in need or
contribute to society at large. Such jobs are presumably attractive to people
with strong altruistic motivations. A rich literature in public administration
has provided empirical evidence in line with this idea. Using a variety of
data and methods, it has been shown that public sector employees are more
inclined to help others or serve the public interest as compared to private
sector employees (see Perry et al. 2010 for a recent overview of the literature).
Inspired by these ndings, a theoretical literature has recently emerged
in economics studying the sorting of di¤erently motivated people into the
public sector and the consequences of this for optimal pay policies and or-
ganizational design (see Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008 for a survey). A
prominent study in this eld is Besley and Ghatak (2005). In their model,
workers are heterogeneous in mission preferences; that is, workers di¤er in
what they consider to be a good cause. Besley and Ghatak show that there
is a premium on matching of mission preferences, implying that workers will
sort to organizations they share a mission with.
This paper contributes to these literatures in two ways. First, building
on Besley and Ghatak (2005), we develop a simple model of sorting into the
public sector in an economy populated by agents who di¤er in both altruism
and mission preferences. We examine how an individuals altruism and the
alignment of his mission preferences with the public sectors mission a¤ect
the likelihood of being employed in the public sector. We show that altruism
and mission alignment are mutually reinforcing. When a workers mission
preferences are well in line with the mission of the public sector, the likeli-
hood of working in the public sector increases in the workers altruism. The
reverse holds when a workers mission preferences conict with the mission
of the public sector. Altruism does not a¤ect sorting of people who feel that
the public sector neither serves nor damages the public interest. Likewise,
mission alignment increases the likelihood of working in the public sector for
altruistic people, but decreases it for spiteful people.
Our second contribution is to test these predictions using a data set cov-
ering employees in a broad range of countries around the world. The existing
literature almost exclusively uses data from countries with a well developed
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public sector, in particular the United States and Western European coun-
tries. We use data from the World Values Survey conducted between 2005
and 2008. Our sample contains data on more than 30.000 respondents from
50 countries, ranging from wealthy countries in North America and Europe
to developing countries in Asia, South America, Africa, and the Middle East.
Such a broad range of countries and corresponding public sector missions is
particularly well suited to test our predictions on the mutually reinforcing
relationship between workers altruism and mission alignment. We measure a
workers altruism by his response to the survey question: "It is important to
this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being". Mission
alignment is proxied by the workers stated condence in political parties.
Further, we observe each workers sector of employment (either government
and public institutions or private business and industry) and a rich set of
individual characteristics (age, gender, education, and country of residence).
The results of our empirical analysis are well in line with our theoretical
predictions. We nd clear evidence that altruism and mission alignment are
mutually reinforcing in determining a workers likelihood of working in the
public sector. The marginal e¤ect of a workers condence in political parties
on the odds of working in the public sector is insignicant and close to zero
for workers in the lowest altruism categories, but signicant and positive for
workers in the highest altruism categories. In other words, mission alignment
only a¤ects sector choice when the worker is su¢ ciently altruistic. Likewise,
the marginal e¤ect of a workers altruism on the odds of working in the pub-
lic sector is strongly increasing in the workers condence in political parties.
Together, these ndings imply that only those workers who exhibit both suf-
cient altruism and su¢ cient condence in political parties are signicantly
more likely to end up working in the public sector; the total e¤ect ranges
up to 37% higher odds as compared to the average worker. Neither work-
ers with high altruism and weak condence nor workers with low altruism
and strong condence show a signicantly higher likelihood of working in the
public sector. In contrast, workers with low altruism and weak condence
are signicantly less likely to work in the public sector; the odds are up to
21% lower as compared to the average worker.
Previous research has shown that altruism or public service motivation
is a better predictor of public sector employment for higher educated workers
(Lewis and Frank 2002). We nd the same pattern in our data for altruism
and condence and, particularly, for the interaction between these two. In-
terestingly, and in contrast to our full sample, we nd some indications for
2
spite among respondents in the lowest altruism category.
We proceed as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of related
literature. In section 3, we develop a simple model and formally derive pre-
dictions. Section 4 describes the data set and explains our empirical strategy.
Section 5 describes and discusses the main results of the empirical analysis.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
A formalization of intrinsic motivation to work in the public sector lies in the
concept of public service motivation. Perry and Wise (1990) gave the rst
comprehensive overview of this concept and dene public service motivation
as an individuals predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily
or uniquely in public institutions and organizations(p. 368). They propose
that workers with high public service motivation are more likely to end up
in a public sector job and will perform better in such a job. Public service
motivation is often equated with a desire to serve the public interest or,
more generally, with altruism. Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) dene public
service motivation as a general altruistic motivation to serve the interests
of a community of people, a state, a nation or humankind(p. 23). We use
their concept of public service motivation.
Recent theoretical research in economics builds on these ideas and as-
sumes that some workers in the economy intrinsically care about serving
the public interest. In these studies, workers care usually stems from al-
truism, be it pure or impure (Francois 2000 and 2007, Glazer 2004, Besley
and Ghatak 2005, Prendergast 2007, Delfgaauw and Dur 2008, Nyborg and
Brekke 2010, Buurman and Dur 2010, and Ghatak and Mueller 2011). A
common nding in this rapidly growing literature is that public sector or-
ganizations optimally set relatively low wages and provide weak monetary
incentives so as to promote self-selection of altruistic workers.
Empirical studies on di¤erences in workersmotivation between the public
and private sector have mainly used data from the US and Western Europe.
Studies using data on self-reported motivation and preferences almost invari-
ably nd that, as compared to private sector workers, public sector workers
have a stronger willingness to serve the public interest, to help others, and
to make personal sacrices in order to do so (Rainey 1982, Crewson 1997,
Houston 2000, and Lewis and Frank 2002). Other studies examine di¤erences
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in self-reported pro-social actions. Brewer (2003) and Houston (2006) nd
that public sector workers are more inclined than private sector workers to
participate in pro-social activities such as volunteering, donating blood, and
taking part in nonpolitical civic a¤airs. Buurman et al. (2009) and Jacobsen
et al. (2011) explore revealed preferences data and nd that public sector
workers are more likely to make a donation to charity than observationally
equivalent private sector workers, particularly at the start of their career.
Lastly, Gregg et al. (2011) use British panel data and nd that workers
in the not-for-prot sector are more likely to donate labour in the form of
unpaid overtime as compared to their for-prot counterparts. This e¤ect is
strongest for industries with caring features such as health, education, and
social care.
Few studies have examined whether these results generalize to less devel-
oped countries. Serneels et al. (2007) show that intrinsic motivation to help
the pooris among the most important determinants of nursing and medical
students willingness to work in the relatively underprivileged rural areas in
Ethiopia. Serra et al. (2011) use both survey and lab-experimental data
and show that pro-socially motivated health professionals in Ethiopia are
more likely to work in the non-prot sector. Lastly, Norris (2003) and Van-
denabeele and Van de Walle (2008) use survey data from the International
Social Survey Program and show that public sector workers score higher on
altruistic attitudes than their private sector counterparts in all world regions
except Asia.
Our key innovation as compared to the existing literature is to treat altru-
ism and mission alignment as distinct characteristics. A few empirical papers
in public administration have studied mission motivationof employees, but
as a substitute rather than as a complement to altruism (Wright 2007). Clos-
est to our paper are Bright (2008), Steijn (2008), Taylor (2008), Wright and
Pandey (2008), and Leisink and Steijn (2009). Inspired by the organizational
psychology literature on person-organization t (Kristof 1996), these studies
show that public sector employees experience higher job satisfaction, have
stronger willingness to exert e¤ort on the job, and are more inclined to stay
in their job if they nd it important to do something useful to society and, in
addition, nd the work that they do useful to society. Unlike these studies,
our data cover employees in both the public sector and the private sector,
which allows us to study the issue of sorting to the public sector in a much
more comprehensive way.
Upon completing the rst draft of this paper, we became aware of two
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other closely related papers. First, Smith and Cowley (2011) use data from
the same wave of the World Values Survey as we use to study the relation
between corruption in a country and the sorting of intrinsically motivated
workers to the public sector. They nd evidence that the di¤erence in in-
trinsic motivation between public and private sector workers in a country de-
creases with government corruption (appropriately instrumented). Second,
Houston (2011) uses data from the International Social Survey Programme
and shows that the desire to help others is signicantly less prevalent among
government workers in Anglo-Saxon welfare regimes as compared to Scandi-
navian welfare regimes. A key di¤erence between these studies and our study
is that we use an individual-level variable for a workers alignment with the
public sectors mission, rather than a nation-specic indicator for all workers.
3 Theory
To x ideas, we develop a simple model building on the inuential paper by
Besley and Ghatak (2005). In our model, people are heterogeneous in two
ways: they di¤er in their willingness to serve the public interest (or altruism),
denoted by i 2 [; ], and in their valuation of the mission of the public sec-
tor (or mission alignment), denoted by i 2 [; ]. Both characteristics are
an individuals private information and are drawn from a continuous distri-
bution.1 Both  and  can take positive and negative values. A negative
 implies that a worker is spiteful; such a worker would rather harm than
serve others.2 A negative  implies that a workers mission preferences con-
ict with the mission of the public sector; that is, this worker feels that the
mission of the public sector harms rather than serves the public interest.
The economy consists of two sectors: a public sector and a private sector.
The private sector is perfectly competitive and neither  nor  matters in
any way, such that people who choose to work in the private sector obtain the
1Note that altruism is impure: Individuals enjoy their personal contribution to the
public interest, as in Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008); see Tonin
and Vlassopoulos (2010) for eld-experimental evidence supporting this assumption. A
key di¤erence with Besley and Ghatak (2005)s model lies in the type space. While their
economy consists of selsh and mission motivated workers, in our model workers are dis-
tributed continuously along two dimensions: altruism and mission alignment.
2Lab experimental evidence shows that, while altruism is much more prevalent, a sub-
stantial fraction of people is spiteful (Andreoni and Miller 2002, Beckman et al. 2002, Falk
et al. 2005, and Fehr et al. 2011).
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same utility, given by U . The public sector o¤ers a wage w and, in addition,
yields some nonpecuniary payo¤ to workers depending on their  and . The
utility from working in the public sector is given by:
Ui = w + ii   "i:
The interaction term ii parsimoniously captures the idea that altruistic
workers (i > 0) only derive some additional nonpecuniary utility from work-
ing in the public sector when they feel that the public sectors mission con-
tributes to the public interest (i > 0).
3 The stochastic term "i captures
all other possible characteristics that may inuence an individuals relative
preference for the public sector. It is drawn from a distribution with CDF
F (") = Pr("i  ") and boundaries " 2 ["; "], such that there is some variation
in most preferred sector for each worker type ii.
A utility maximizing worker joins the public sector when the utility from
doing so is higher than the utility from working in the private sector. The
proportion of workers of type ii choosing public sector employment is given
by:
Pr["i  w   U + ii] = F (w   U + ii):
It immediately follows that the likelihood of public sector employment in-
creases in workersaltruism for workers who feel that the public sector serves
the public interest ( > 0):
@F ()
@i
= if(w   U + ii):
Conversely, for workers who feel that the public sector harms the public
interest ( < 0), the likelihood of working in the public sector decreases in
the workersaltruism. Altruism has no e¤ect for workers who are indi¤erent
about the public sectors mission ( = 0).
3We implicitly assume that workers have little or no discretion on the job and so
take the public sectors mission as given. Prendergast (2007) and Buurman and Dur
(2010) study sorting when workers have more leeway, which may result in bifurcated self-
selection. Further note that endogenous e¤ort choice by workers need not change any of
our conclusions. For instance, a model where utility from working in the public sector is
given by Ui = w+ iiei   12e2i   "i (where ei is worker is e¤ort choice) produces exactly
the same predictions as long as the public sector imposes a strictly positive minimum e¤ort
requirement (which seems reasonable).
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Likewise, it follows that an increase in workersmission alignment in-
creases the likelihood of working in the public sector for altruistic workers
( > 0), decreases it for spiteful workers ( < 0), and leaves it una¤ected for
selsh workers ( = 0):
@F ()
@i
= if(w   U + ii):
Summarizing, our model thus yields the following key predictions:
Prediction 1 An increase in workersaltruism ( ) increases the likelihood
of working in the public sector for workers who feel that the public
sector serves the public interest ( > 0), decreases it for workers who
feel that the public sector harms the public interest ( < 0), and leaves
it una¤ected for indi¤erent workers ( = 0).
Prediction 2 An increase in workersmission alignment () increases the
likelihood of working in the public sector for altruistic workers (  > 0),
decreases it for spiteful workers (  < 0), and leaves it una¤ected for
selsh workers (  = 0).
The resulting predicted probabilities of working in the public sector are
depicted in Figure 1. The model predicts that workers who are highly al-
truistic and whose mission preferences are strongly aligned with the public
sectors mission are overrepresented in the public sector. The same is true
for workers who are highly spiteful and feel that the public sector damages
the public interest. Highly altruistic workers with mission conict and highly
spiteful workers with mission alignment will be underrepresented in the pub-
lic sector.
4 Data and empirical strategy
We test our key predictions using data from the World Values Survey, con-
ducted by theWorld Values Survey Organization (2009). This survey consists
of several waves, starting in 1981. We use data from the 2005-2008 wave4
4Previous waves are excluded from the analysis because these waves do not contain
questions on altruism and sector of employment.
7
that contains one year of observations for each country. The total number
of respondents is 82.992. Respondents answered questions on a wide range
of topics, including social, cultural, and political attitudes and a large set of
demographics. Questionnaires were carried out face-to-face.5 The range of
countries is very diverse, ranging from wealthy OECD countries to developing
countries in South America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
The key variables of interest are stated altruism, condence in political
parties, and sector of employment. Respondents faced the question "It is
important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-
being" and were asked to score themselves on a six point scale ranging from
"very much like me" to "not at all like me". We use this as a measure of
altruism.6 Furthermore, respondents were asked to score their condence in
political parties on a four point scale ranging from "a great deal" to "none
at all". We use this as a proxy for the workers valuation of the mission
he contributes to when working in the public sector. Thus, we assume that
workers with high condence in political parties feel that they contribute to
a good cause by working in the public sector, while this holds to a smaller
extent for workers with less condence.7 Note that our data do not allow us
to distinguish spiteful from indi¤erent workers as both types of people will
answer "not at all like me" to the question on altruism. Nor can we really
distinguish workers with conicting mission preferences from workers with a
more neutral stance towards the public sectors mission, as both will most
likely answer "none at all" to the question on condence in political parties.
Hence, the variation in our data mainly stems fromworkers who are at least to
5With the exception of Japan and Australia, where paper-and-pencil questionnaires
were administered.
6Ideally, the question would not refer to people nearbybut, more generally, to peo-
ple. Care for people nearby is a good proxy for care for people more generally if these
measures for altruism are positively correlated. We examined data from the General So-
cial Survey and indeed nd a strong positive correlation between I would rather su¤er
myself than let the one I love su¤er.and Personally assisting people in trouble is very
important to me..
7We readily admit that this is not an ideal measure of mission alignment, as political
parties are an important but not the sole determinant of the public sectors mission. To our
knowledge, a dataset covering workers in both the public and private sector and containing
both a measure of altruism and a better measure of mission alignment does not exist. In
addition to the question on condence in political parties, the World Values Survey also
contains a question on condence in parliament. Performing our empirical analysis using
this measure instead of condence in political parties gives similar but slightly weaker
results.
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some extent altruistic and who have a relatively positive attitude towards the
public sectors mission. Nevertheless, as we shall see, we nd some indication
for spite among highly educated workers in the lowest altruism category.
We restrict our analysis to respondents with a job (either full time, part
time, or self employed) who work either in government and public institutions
or in private business and industry. We omit all workers from private not-
for-prot organizations, as it is not obvious how to classify these.8 These
restrictions result in a sample of 30.652 workers in 50 di¤erent countries,9 of
whom 9.002 (29.4%) work in the public sector. The number of observations
per country ranges from 436 to 1.394.
The sector of employment variable is recoded to a dichotomous variable
scoring one when public sector and zero when private sector. We use binary
logistic regression10 to estimate the odds that an individual with given char-
acteristics works in the public sector. We control for several demographics
Dk, such as age, gender, and education level of a worker. We include country
xed e¤ects j to control for unobserved heterogeneity between countries.
The specication of our regression equation is:
ln

Pr(public)
Pr(private)

= A+ C +  (A C) +
X
kDk + j + "; (1)
where A is our measure of altruism, C measures condence in political par-
ties, and " is the error term. For ease of interpretation of the coe¢ cients,
A and C are both mean-centred. Our key parameter of interest is  , which
should be positive when altruism and condence in political parties are mu-
tually reinforcing, as our theory suggests. We perform a test whether  = 0
8In some countries, not-for-prot organizations are highly subsidized and under control
of the public sector. In others, not-for-prot organizations are much more autonomous
and sometimes function as a substitute for public goods provision by the government.
9Countries included in the analysis are: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mol-
dava, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slove-
nia, South Africa, South Korea, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Viet-
nam, and Zambia.
10We prefer binary logistic regression over probit regression because it simplies the
interpretation of results. Running the analysis with binary logistic regression gives a
slightly better t than probit (based on McFadden R2).
9
against the one sided alternative that it is positive. Our theory provides little
guidance regarding the signs of  and . However, following prediction 1, the
sum of  and  should be positive for su¢ ciently high values of C. Likewise,
following prediction 2, the sum of  and  should be positive for su¢ ciently
high values of A. We shall test these predictions by computing the marginal
e¤ects and the corresponding standard errors for all possible values of A and
C.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample.11 Both altruism and
condence in political parties are slightly higher among public sector workers
as compared to private sector workers. This can also be seen in Figures 2 and
3. There are some remarkable di¤erences in demographics between public and
private sector workers. Public sector workers are more likely female, higher
educated, and slightly older as compared to private sector workers. In the
empirical analysis we shall control for these di¤erences in observables.
5 Results
Table 2 shows the results of the binary logistic regressions for the full sample
of workers. We report both the regression estimates b and the exponent of the
regression estimates exp(b). The exponent of the regression estimate minus
one gives the estimated marginal change in odds given a unit change in the
independent variable. Following most previous studies, our rst estimation
includes only altruism as explanatory variable. Clearly, workers with higher
levels of altruism are more likely to be employed in the public sector. This
e¤ect is both economically and statistically signicant. A marginal increase
by one from the mean of the altruism variable results in 8% higher odds of
working in the public sector instead of the private sector.12 This implies a
substantial di¤erence in the odds of working in the public sector instead of
the private sector of 47% (1:0805 = 1: 469 ) between the least altruistic people
and the most altruistic people in our sample. This result is well in line with
the earlier empirical studies discussed in section 2.
Next we control for demographic characteristics and country dummies.
The e¤ect of altruism is robust in sign and signicance; the marginal e¤ect
11Compared to the original data, scales of altruism and condence in political parties
are reversed for interpretational purposes.
12We also tested for nonlinear e¤ects of altruism, but these turn out to be insignicant
and add little explanatory power.
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of altruism decreases from 8% to 7%, but remains highly signicant. We
nd strong evidence for the inuence of the demographic control variables
on sector choice. Consistent with earlier studies (e.g. Lewis and Frank 2002,
Buurman et al. 2009), we nd that the likelihood of being employed in the
public sector is higher for females and increases with age and education.13
The country dummies, which control for unobserved di¤erences across coun-
tries, are jointly highly signicant (p < 0:01).
Column 3 of Table 2 includes condence in political parties and the in-
teraction with altruism as explanatory variables. The conditional marginal
e¤ect of altruism remains economically and statistically signicant. The mar-
ginal e¤ect of altruism is 6,4%, given average condence in political parties.
The control variables remain signicant with similar magnitudes and signs
as compared to the second estimation. The marginal e¤ect of condence in
political parties conditional on average altruism is also signicant and posi-
tive; an increase of condence in political parties results in 9,4% higher odds
to work in the public sector instead of the private sector. We nd evidence
in support of our key prediction, the one-sided test for a positive interac-
tion e¤ect between altruism and condence in political parties is signicant
(p = 0:066). A unit increase of condence in political parties leads to an
additional marginal e¤ect of altruism of 2,4%. Table 3 shows in more de-
tail how the marginal e¤ect of altruism changes with condence in political
parties, and also how the marginal e¤ect of condence in political parties
changes with altruism. Well in line with our predictions, the marginal e¤ect
of a workers altruism is strongly increasing in the workers condence in po-
litical parties. Similarly, we nd no signicant marginal e¤ect of condence
in political parties for low values of altruism and positive and signicant ef-
fects for high values. In contrast to our predictions, we do not nd negative
marginal e¤ects of altruism and condence at the lower ends of the scales.
As discussed in the previous section, this may well be due to the fact that
we cannot distinguish spiteful workers and workers with conicting mission
preferences from workers with a more neutral stance.
Figure 4 depicts for each possible combination of altruism and condence
in political parties, the estimated di¤erence in odds (and its 95% condence
interval in transparent planes) to work in the public sector as compared to
people with average altruism and condence in political parties. Clearly,
13Wald tests show that the educational dummies di¤er signicantly from each other
(p < 0:01; level 5 and 6 at p < 0:10).
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highly altruistic workers with strong condence in political parties are very
likely to work in the public sector, with a positive and signicant total ef-
fect of up to 37% on the odds as compared to the average worker. In con-
trast, a non-altruistic worker with weak condence shows a signicant lower
likelihood of working in the public sector (total e¤ect up to  21% on the
odds). Altruistic workers with weak condence and non-altruistic workers
with strong condence are not signicantly more or less likely to work in the
public sector.
Previous research has shown that public service motivation is a more im-
portant determinant of sector of employment for higher educated workers
(Lewis and Frank 2002). To assess di¤erences between education levels in
our sample, we estimate equation (1) for three subsamples: a low, interme-
diate, and high level of education.14 Table 4 reports the estimation results
for these subsamples. Well in line with Lewis and Frank (2002), we nd rela-
tively weak e¤ects for workers with low and intermediate education, while for
highly educated workers we nd very strong e¤ects on sector of employment
of altruism, condence in political parties, and, in particular, for the inter-
action between these two. The coe¢ cient for the interaction term is more
than three times as large as compared to the regression using the full sample
and highly signicant (p < 0:01). Our hypothesis that altruism and mis-
sion alignment are mutually reinforcing thus nds strong support among the
highly educated workers. Table 5 reports the corresponding marginal e¤ects
for the subsample of highly educated workers. In line with our predictions,
we nd no signicant marginal e¤ect of altruism for low values of condence
in political parties, while the marginal e¤ect is positive and highly signi-
cant for high values of condence. Likewise, we nd a positive and signicant
marginal e¤ect of condence in political parties on public sector employment
for highly altruistic workers. For the middle altruism categories, we nd no
signicant marginal e¤ect of condence. Lastly, for the lowest altruism cate-
gory, we nd a sizeable but insignicant negative marginal e¤ect (p = 0:11).
While remarkable, this is fully consistent with our model if many of the
people in the lowest altruism category are spiteful.
Figure 5 plots the estimated di¤erence in odds to work in the public sector
14The low subsample includes all workers who have less than secondary education (cate-
gories 1 to 4 in the dataset), the intermediate subsample includes all workers with at least
secondary education and at most university prepatory (categories 5 to 7), and the high
subsample includes all workers with more than university prepatory education (category
8 and 9).
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for the subsample of highly educated workers. Highly educated workers with
high altruism and strong condence in political parties face up to 71% higher
odds of working in the public sector as compared to the average worker.
Highly altruistic workers with weak condence and non-altruistic workers
with strong condence show a signicant lower likelihood of working in the
public sector. All three ndings are consistent with our model, with the
latter two indicative of conict of mission preferences and spite among the
highly educated workforce, respectively.
6 Conclusion
We have studied how a workers altruism and mission preferences jointly af-
fect his likelihood of working in the public sector rather than taking a job
in the private sector. We built a very simple model that predicts that al-
truism and alignment of mission preferences with the mission of the public
sector are mutually reinforcing forces. Simply put, our theory predicts that
alignment of mission preferences matters more when a workers altruism is
higher and that altruism matters more when mission preferences are more
closely aligned. We have tested these predictions using data from the World
Values Survey, containing data on over 30.000 workers, covering their sector
of employment, their willingness to help other people (altruism), and their
condence in political parties (which we take as a proxy for alignment with
the public sectors mission). We nd strong evidence for a mutually rein-
forcing role of altruism and mission alignment, particularly among highly
educated workers. Our results show that only those workers who are highly
altruistic as well as have strong condence in political parties have a signif-
icantly higher likelihood of working in the public sector, while workers with
low altruism and weak condence are signicantly less likely to work in the
public sector. The size of these e¤ects is substantial. Highly altruistic work-
ers with weak condence and non-altruistic workers with strong condence
are neither more nor less likely to sort to the public sector in the full sample.
Among highly educated workers, the latter two groups have a signicantly
lower likelihood of working in the public sector. These results indicate that
conict of mission preferences and spite discourages some highly educated
workers to sort into the public sector.
A caveat of our analysis (that we share with most previous studies) is
that we cannot distinguish whether our results originate from (self-)selection
13
of workers or from preference adaptation (see Wright and Grant 2010 for an
interesting discussion of this issue). For instance, we cannot rule out that the
patterns that we nd in our data are non-existent for workers who just started
their career and so entirely arise from adaption of preferences since workers
have started a job in a particular sector. Following this interpretation of our
results, employees acquire higher condence in political parties and become
more altruistic when working in the public sector. While this interpretation
may have some intuitive appeal, the available empirical evidence points in
the opposite direction for public sector workers altruism. That is, when
tenure increases, workers in the public sector tend to experience a decrease
rather than an increase in altruistic motivations (see Blau 1960, Van Maanen
1975, Moynihan and Pandey 2007, De Cooman et al. 2009, and Buurman
et al. 2009). Future research should provide insight into whether the same
holds for condence in political parties.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
obs. Public Private Total
Altruism 30652
Mean 4.78 4.68 4.71
Standard deviation (1.08) (1.11) (1.11)
Confidence in Political Parties 28429
Mean 2.09 2.03 2.05
Standard deviation (0.82) (0.80) (0.81)
Gender: % Female 30463
Mean 0.49 0.39 0.42
Standard deviation (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Age: Years 30463
Mean 40.49 38.45 39.05
Standard deviation (11.33) (12.34) (12.08)
Education: % Level 30463
None 0.01 0.07 0.05
Incomplete Primary 0.02 0.05 0.04
Primary 0.05 0.12 0.10
Incomplete Secondary 0.05 0.07 0.06
Secondary 0.22 0.22 0.22
Incomplete University Preparatory 0.05 0.06 0.06
University Preparatory 0.17 0.17 0.17
University: no degree 0.10 0.07 0.08
University 0.34 0.15 0.21
Countries 50
Observations 9002 21650 30652
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Table 2: Results of the binary logistic regression (full sample)
b Exp(b) b Exp(b) b Exp(b)
Altruism 0.077 *** 1.080 0.068 *** 1.070 0.062 *** 1.064
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Female 0.476 *** 1.609 0.457 *** 1.579
(0.028) (0.029)
Age 0.100 *** 1.105 0.094 *** 1.099
(0.007) (0.007)
Age² -0.001 *** 0.999 -0.001 *** 0.999
(0.000) (0.000)
Education=2 0.626 *** 1.870 0.752 *** 2.121
(0.139) (0.160)
Education=3 1.092 *** 2.980 1.183 *** 3.264
(0.120) (0.141)
Education=4 1.526 *** 4.600 1.639 *** 5.150
(0.125) (0.144)
Education=5 2.033 *** 7.637 2.142 *** 8.516
(0.115) (0.136)
Education=6 1.921 *** 6.828 1.957 *** 7.078
(0.124) (0.145)
Education=7 2.167 *** 8.732 2.249 *** 9.478
(0.115) (0.137)
Education=8 2.416 *** 11.201 2.517 *** 12.391
(0.120) (0.141)
Education=9 2.946 *** 19.030 3.074 *** 21.628
(0.115) (0.136)
Confidence 0.090 *** 1.094
(0.019)
Confidence*Altruism 0.024 * 1.024
(0.016)
Intercept -0.879 *** 0.415 -5.605 *** 0.004 -5.534 *** 0.004
(0.013) (0.215) (0.230)
Country Dummies No Yes Yes
Observations Dep=0 21650 21537 20196
Observations Dep=1 9002 8926 8233
Total Observations 30652 30463 28429
McFadden R² 0.001 0.124 0.119
Log Likelihood -18535 -16149 -15068
Notes:  Standard errors between parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
Variables altruism and confidence are centered around their sample mean.
Dependent variable: sector of employment
(1) (2) (3)
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Table 3: Marginal e¤ects (full sample)
Confidence in political parties 1 2 3 4
dln(odds)/dAltruism 0.037* 0.061*** 0.085*** 0.109***
(0.021) (0.014) (0.021) (0.035)
Altruism 1 2 3 4 5 6
dln(odds)/dConfidence 0.001 0.025 0.049 0.073*** 0.097*** 0.121***
(0.064) (0.048) (0.034) (0.023) (0.019) (0.027)
Notes:  Standard errors between parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (based on Wald tests).
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Table 4: Results of regression with sample split on educational level
Group:
b Exp(b) b Exp(b) b Exp(b)
Altruism 0.056 1.058 0.047 ** 1.048 0.077 *** 1.080
(0.035) (0.020) (0.024)
Female 0.200 *** 1.221 0.364 *** 1.440 0.693 *** 2.000
(0.076) (0.043) (0.049)
Age 0.058 *** 1.060 0.087 *** 1.091 0.129 *** 1.138
(0.017) (0.011) (0.014)
Age² 0.000 ** 1.000 -0.001 *** 0.999 -0.001 *** 0.999
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education=2 0.391 ** 1.478
(0.173)
Education=3 0.576 *** 1.779
(0.158)
Education=4 0.982 *** 2.670
(0.166)
Education=5
Education=6 -0.213 *** 0.808
(0.076)
Education=7 0.140 *** 1.150
(0.050)
Education=8
Education=9 0.585 *** 1.795
(0.058)
Confidence 0.079 * 1.082 0.104 *** 1.110 0.114 *** 1.121
(0.047) (0.028) (0.034)
Confidence*Altruism -0.012 0.989 -0.002 0.998 0.081 *** 1.084
(0.037) (0.023) (0.029)
Intercept -3.820 *** 0.022 -3.437 *** 0.032 -3.894 *** 0.020
(0.408) (0.328) (0.327)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations Dep=0 6115 9357 4724
Observations Dep=1 1004 3598 3631
Total Observations 7119 12955 8355
McFadden R² 0.126 0.083 0.087
Log Likelihood -2531 -7020 -5220
Notes:  Standard errors between parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
Variables altruism and confidence are centered around their sample mean.
Dependent variable: sector of employment
Low Intermediate High
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Table 5: Marginal e¤ects (high education subsample)
Confidence in political parties 1 2 3 4
dln(odds)/dAltruism -0.005 0.076*** 0.157*** 0.238***
(0.037) (0.024) (0.037) (0.063)
Altruism 1 2 3 4 5 6
dln(odds)/dConfidence -0.185 -0.104 -0.024 0.057 0.138*** 0.219***
(0.114) (0.087) (0.062) (0.041) (0.034) (0.049)
Notes:  Standard errors between parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (based on Wald tests).
24
Figures
Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of working in the public sector
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Figure 2: Density of altruism
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Figure 3: Density of condence in political parties
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Figure 4: Total e¤ect on the odds of working in the public sector of altruism
and condence in political parties (full sample)
28
Figure 5: Total e¤ect on the odds of working in the public sector of altruism
and condence in political parties (high education subsample)
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Abstract
A rich literature in public administration has shown that pub-
lic sector employees have stronger altruistic motivations than private
sector employees. Recent economic theories stress the importance of
mission preferences, and predict that altruistic people sort into the
public sector when they subscribe to its mission. This paper uses
data from a representative survey among more than 30.000 employ-
ees from 50 countries to test this prediction. Our results show that
only those individuals who are willing to contribute to the welfare of
others and, in addition, feel that by working in the public sector they
contribute to a good cause are signicantly more likely to work in the
public sector. Our results are most pronounced for highly educated
employees.
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1 Introduction
Many jobs in the public sector involve tasks that help people in need or
contribute to society at large. Such jobs are presumably attractive to people
with strong altruistic motivations. A rich literature in public administration
has provided empirical evidence in line with this idea. Using a variety of
data and methods, it has been shown that public sector employees are more
inclined to help others or serve the public interest as compared to private
sector employees (see Perry et al. 2010 for a recent overview of the literature).
Inspired by these ndings, a theoretical literature has recently emerged
in economics studying the sorting of di¤erently motivated people into the
public sector and the consequences of this for optimal pay policies and or-
ganizational design (see Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008 for a survey). A
prominent study in this eld is Besley and Ghatak (2005). In their model,
workers are heterogeneous in mission preferences; that is, workers di¤er in
what they consider to be a good cause. Besley and Ghatak show that there
is a premium on matching of mission preferences, implying that workers will
sort to organizations they share a mission with.
This paper contributes to these literatures in two ways. First, building
on Besley and Ghatak (2005), we develop a simple model of sorting into the
public sector in an economy populated by agents who di¤er in both altruism
and mission preferences. We examine how an individuals altruism and the
alignment of his mission preferences with the public sectors mission a¤ect
the likelihood of being employed in the public sector. We show that altruism
and mission alignment are mutually reinforcing. When a workers mission
preferences are well in line with the mission of the public sector, the likeli-
hood of working in the public sector increases in the workers altruism. The
reverse holds when a workers mission preferences conict with the mission
of the public sector. Altruism does not a¤ect sorting of people who feel that
the public sector neither serves nor damages the public interest. Likewise,
mission alignment increases the likelihood of working in the public sector for
altruistic people, but decreases it for spiteful people.
Our second contribution is to test these predictions using a data set cov-
ering employees in a broad range of countries around the world. The existing
literature almost exclusively uses data from countries with a well developed
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public sector, in particular the United States and Western European coun-
tries. We use data from the World Values Survey conducted between 2005
and 2008. Our sample contains data on more than 30.000 respondents from
50 countries, ranging from wealthy countries in North America and Europe
to developing countries in Asia, South America, Africa, and the Middle East.
Such a broad range of countries and corresponding public sector missions is
particularly well suited to test our predictions on the mutually reinforcing
relationship between workers altruism and mission alignment. We measure a
workers altruism by his response to the survey question: "It is important to
this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being". Mission
alignment is proxied by the workers stated condence in political parties.
Further, we observe each workers sector of employment (either government
and public institutions or private business and industry) and a rich set of
individual characteristics (age, gender, education, and country of residence).
The results of our empirical analysis are well in line with our theoretical
predictions. We nd clear evidence that altruism and mission alignment are
mutually reinforcing in determining a workers likelihood of working in the
public sector. The marginal e¤ect of a workers condence in political parties
on the odds of working in the public sector is insignicant and close to zero
for workers in the lowest altruism categories, but signicant and positive for
workers in the highest altruism categories. In other words, mission alignment
only a¤ects sector choice when the worker is su¢ ciently altruistic. Likewise,
the marginal e¤ect of a workers altruism on the odds of working in the pub-
lic sector is strongly increasing in the workers condence in political parties.
Together, these ndings imply that only those workers who exhibit both suf-
cient altruism and su¢ cient condence in political parties are signicantly
more likely to end up working in the public sector; the total e¤ect ranges
up to 37% higher odds as compared to the average worker. Neither work-
ers with high altruism and weak condence nor workers with low altruism
and strong condence show a signicantly higher likelihood of working in the
public sector. In contrast, workers with low altruism and weak condence
are signicantly less likely to work in the public sector; the odds are up to
21% lower as compared to the average worker.
Previous research has shown that altruism or public service motivation
is a better predictor of public sector employment for higher educated workers
(Lewis and Frank 2002). We nd the same pattern in our data for altruism
and condence and, particularly, for the interaction between these two. In-
terestingly, and in contrast to our full sample, we nd some indications for
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spite among respondents in the lowest altruism category.
We proceed as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of related
literature. In section 3, we develop a simple model and formally derive pre-
dictions. Section 4 describes the data set and explains our empirical strategy.
Section 5 describes and discusses the main results of the empirical analysis.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
A formalization of intrinsic motivation to work in the public sector lies in the
concept of public service motivation. Perry and Wise (1990) gave the rst
comprehensive overview of this concept and dene public service motivation
as an individuals predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily
or uniquely in public institutions and organizations(p. 368). They propose
that workers with high public service motivation are more likely to end up
in a public sector job and will perform better in such a job. Public service
motivation is often equated with a desire to serve the public interest or,
more generally, with altruism. Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) dene public
service motivation as a general altruistic motivation to serve the interests
of a community of people, a state, a nation or humankind(p. 23). We use
their concept of public service motivation.
Recent theoretical research in economics builds on these ideas and as-
sumes that some workers in the economy intrinsically care about serving
the public interest. In these studies, workers care usually stems from al-
truism, be it pure or impure (Francois 2000 and 2007, Glazer 2004, Besley
and Ghatak 2005, Prendergast 2007, Delfgaauw and Dur 2008, Nyborg and
Brekke 2010, Buurman and Dur 2010, and Ghatak and Mueller 2011). A
common nding in this rapidly growing literature is that public sector or-
ganizations optimally set relatively low wages and provide weak monetary
incentives so as to promote self-selection of altruistic workers.
Empirical studies on di¤erences in workersmotivation between the public
and private sector have mainly used data from the US and Western Europe.
Studies using data on self-reported motivation and preferences almost invari-
ably nd that, as compared to private sector workers, public sector workers
have a stronger willingness to serve the public interest, to help others, and
to make personal sacrices in order to do so (Rainey 1982, Crewson 1997,
Houston 2000, and Lewis and Frank 2002). Other studies examine di¤erences
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in self-reported pro-social actions. Brewer (2003) and Houston (2006) nd
that public sector workers are more inclined than private sector workers to
participate in pro-social activities such as volunteering, donating blood, and
taking part in nonpolitical civic a¤airs. Buurman et al. (2009) and Jacobsen
et al. (2011) explore revealed preferences data and nd that public sector
workers are more likely to make a donation to charity than observationally
equivalent private sector workers, particularly at the start of their career.
Lastly, Gregg et al. (2011) use British panel data and nd that workers
in the not-for-prot sector are more likely to donate labour in the form of
unpaid overtime as compared to their for-prot counterparts. This e¤ect is
strongest for industries with caring features such as health, education, and
social care.
Few studies have examined whether these results generalize to less devel-
oped countries. Serneels et al. (2007) show that intrinsic motivation to help
the pooris among the most important determinants of nursing and medical
students willingness to work in the relatively underprivileged rural areas in
Ethiopia. Serra et al. (2011) use both survey and lab-experimental data
and show that pro-socially motivated health professionals in Ethiopia are
more likely to work in the non-prot sector. Lastly, Norris (2003) and Van-
denabeele and Van de Walle (2008) use survey data from the International
Social Survey Program and show that public sector workers score higher on
altruistic attitudes than their private sector counterparts in all world regions
except Asia.
Our key innovation as compared to the existing literature is to treat altru-
ism and mission alignment as distinct characteristics. A few empirical papers
in public administration have studied mission motivationof employees, but
as a substitute rather than as a complement to altruism (Wright 2007). Clos-
est to our paper are Bright (2008), Steijn (2008), Taylor (2008), Wright and
Pandey (2008), and Leisink and Steijn (2009). Inspired by the organizational
psychology literature on person-organization t (Kristof 1996), these studies
show that public sector employees experience higher job satisfaction, have
stronger willingness to exert e¤ort on the job, and are more inclined to stay
in their job if they nd it important to do something useful to society and, in
addition, nd the work that they do useful to society. Unlike these studies,
our data cover employees in both the public sector and the private sector,
which allows us to study the issue of sorting to the public sector in a much
more comprehensive way.
Upon completing the rst draft of this paper, we became aware of two
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other closely related papers. First, Smith and Cowley (2011) use data from
the same wave of the World Values Survey as we use to study the relation
between corruption in a country and the sorting of intrinsically motivated
workers to the public sector. They nd evidence that the di¤erence in in-
trinsic motivation between public and private sector workers in a country de-
creases with government corruption (appropriately instrumented). Second,
Houston (2011) uses data from the International Social Survey Programme
and shows that the desire to help others is signicantly less prevalent among
government workers in Anglo-Saxon welfare regimes as compared to Scandi-
navian welfare regimes. A key di¤erence between these studies and our study
is that we use an individual-level variable for a workers alignment with the
public sectors mission, rather than a nation-specic indicator for all workers.
3 Theory
To x ideas, we develop a simple model building on the inuential paper by
Besley and Ghatak (2005). In our model, people are heterogeneous in two
ways: they di¤er in their willingness to serve the public interest (or altruism),
denoted by i 2 [; ], and in their valuation of the mission of the public sec-
tor (or mission alignment), denoted by i 2 [; ]. Both characteristics are
an individuals private information and are drawn from a continuous distri-
bution.1 Both  and  can take positive and negative values. A negative
 implies that a worker is spiteful; such a worker would rather harm than
serve others.2 A negative  implies that a workers mission preferences con-
ict with the mission of the public sector; that is, this worker feels that the
mission of the public sector harms rather than serves the public interest.
The economy consists of two sectors: a public sector and a private sector.
The private sector is perfectly competitive and neither  nor  matters in
any way, such that people who choose to work in the private sector obtain the
1Note that altruism is impure: Individuals enjoy their personal contribution to the
public interest, as in Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008); see Tonin
and Vlassopoulos (2010) for eld-experimental evidence supporting this assumption. A
key di¤erence with Besley and Ghatak (2005)s model lies in the type space. While their
economy consists of selsh and mission motivated workers, in our model workers are dis-
tributed continuously along two dimensions: altruism and mission alignment.
2Lab experimental evidence shows that, while altruism is much more prevalent, a sub-
stantial fraction of people is spiteful (Andreoni and Miller 2002, Beckman et al. 2002, Falk
et al. 2005, and Fehr et al. 2011).
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same utility, given by U . The public sector o¤ers a wage w and, in addition,
yields some nonpecuniary payo¤ to workers depending on their  and . The
utility from working in the public sector is given by:
Ui = w + ii   "i:
The interaction term ii parsimoniously captures the idea that altruistic
workers (i > 0) only derive some additional nonpecuniary utility from work-
ing in the public sector when they feel that the public sectors mission con-
tributes to the public interest (i > 0).
3 The stochastic term "i captures
all other possible characteristics that may inuence an individuals relative
preference for the public sector. It is drawn from a distribution with CDF
F (") = Pr("i  ") and boundaries " 2 ["; "], such that there is some variation
in most preferred sector for each worker type ii.
A utility maximizing worker joins the public sector when the utility from
doing so is higher than the utility from working in the private sector. The
proportion of workers of type ii choosing public sector employment is given
by:
Pr["i  w   U + ii] = F (w   U + ii):
It immediately follows that the likelihood of public sector employment in-
creases in workersaltruism for workers who feel that the public sector serves
the public interest ( > 0):
@F ()
@i
= if(w   U + ii):
Conversely, for workers who feel that the public sector harms the public
interest ( < 0), the likelihood of working in the public sector decreases in
the workersaltruism. Altruism has no e¤ect for workers who are indi¤erent
about the public sectors mission ( = 0).
3We implicitly assume that workers have little or no discretion on the job and so
take the public sectors mission as given. Prendergast (2007) and Buurman and Dur
(2010) study sorting when workers have more leeway, which may result in bifurcated self-
selection. Further note that endogenous e¤ort choice by workers need not change any of
our conclusions. For instance, a model where utility from working in the public sector is
given by Ui = w+ iiei   12e2i   "i (where ei is worker is e¤ort choice) produces exactly
the same predictions as long as the public sector imposes a strictly positive minimum e¤ort
requirement (which seems reasonable).
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Likewise, it follows that an increase in workersmission alignment in-
creases the likelihood of working in the public sector for altruistic workers
( > 0), decreases it for spiteful workers ( < 0), and leaves it una¤ected for
selsh workers ( = 0):
@F ()
@i
= if(w   U + ii):
Summarizing, our model thus yields the following key predictions:
Prediction 1 An increase in workersaltruism ( ) increases the likelihood
of working in the public sector for workers who feel that the public
sector serves the public interest ( > 0), decreases it for workers who
feel that the public sector harms the public interest ( < 0), and leaves
it una¤ected for indi¤erent workers ( = 0).
Prediction 2 An increase in workersmission alignment () increases the
likelihood of working in the public sector for altruistic workers (  > 0),
decreases it for spiteful workers (  < 0), and leaves it una¤ected for
selsh workers (  = 0).
The resulting predicted probabilities of working in the public sector are
depicted in Figure 1. The model predicts that workers who are highly al-
truistic and whose mission preferences are strongly aligned with the public
sectors mission are overrepresented in the public sector. The same is true
for workers who are highly spiteful and feel that the public sector damages
the public interest. Highly altruistic workers with mission conict and highly
spiteful workers with mission alignment will be underrepresented in the pub-
lic sector.
4 Data and empirical strategy
We test our key predictions using data from the World Values Survey, con-
ducted by theWorld Values Survey Organization (2009). This survey consists
of several waves, starting in 1981. We use data from the 2005-2008 wave4
4Previous waves are excluded from the analysis because these waves do not contain
questions on altruism and sector of employment.
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that contains one year of observations for each country. The total number
of respondents is 82.992. Respondents answered questions on a wide range
of topics, including social, cultural, and political attitudes and a large set of
demographics. Questionnaires were carried out face-to-face.5 The range of
countries is very diverse, ranging from wealthy OECD countries to developing
countries in South America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
The key variables of interest are stated altruism, condence in political
parties, and sector of employment. Respondents faced the question "It is
important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-
being" and were asked to score themselves on a six point scale ranging from
"very much like me" to "not at all like me". We use this as a measure of
altruism.6 Furthermore, respondents were asked to score their condence in
political parties on a four point scale ranging from "a great deal" to "none
at all". We use this as a proxy for the workers valuation of the mission
he contributes to when working in the public sector. Thus, we assume that
workers with high condence in political parties feel that they contribute to
a good cause by working in the public sector, while this holds to a smaller
extent for workers with less condence.7 Note that our data do not allow us
to distinguish spiteful from indi¤erent workers as both types of people will
answer "not at all like me" to the question on altruism. Nor can we really
distinguish workers with conicting mission preferences from workers with a
more neutral stance towards the public sectors mission, as both will most
likely answer "none at all" to the question on condence in political parties.
Hence, the variation in our data mainly stems fromworkers who are at least to
5With the exception of Japan and Australia, where paper-and-pencil questionnaires
were administered.
6Ideally, the question would not refer to people nearbybut, more generally, to peo-
ple. Care for people nearby is a good proxy for care for people more generally if these
measures for altruism are positively correlated. We examined data from the General So-
cial Survey and indeed nd a strong positive correlation between I would rather su¤er
myself than let the one I love su¤er.and Personally assisting people in trouble is very
important to me..
7We readily admit that this is not an ideal measure of mission alignment, as political
parties are an important but not the sole determinant of the public sectors mission. To our
knowledge, a dataset covering workers in both the public and private sector and containing
both a measure of altruism and a better measure of mission alignment does not exist. In
addition to the question on condence in political parties, the World Values Survey also
contains a question on condence in parliament. Performing our empirical analysis using
this measure instead of condence in political parties gives similar but slightly weaker
results.
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some extent altruistic and who have a relatively positive attitude towards the
public sectors mission. Nevertheless, as we shall see, we nd some indication
for spite among highly educated workers in the lowest altruism category.
We restrict our analysis to respondents with a job (either full time, part
time, or self employed) who work either in government and public institutions
or in private business and industry. We omit all workers from private not-
for-prot organizations, as it is not obvious how to classify these.8 These
restrictions result in a sample of 30.652 workers in 50 di¤erent countries,9 of
whom 9.002 (29.4%) work in the public sector. The number of observations
per country ranges from 436 to 1.394.
The sector of employment variable is recoded to a dichotomous variable
scoring one when public sector and zero when private sector. We use binary
logistic regression10 to estimate the odds that an individual with given char-
acteristics works in the public sector. We control for several demographics
Dk, such as age, gender, and education level of a worker. We include country
xed e¤ects j to control for unobserved heterogeneity between countries.
The specication of our regression equation is:
ln

Pr(public)
Pr(private)

= A+ C +  (A C) +
X
kDk + j + "; (1)
where A is our measure of altruism, C measures condence in political par-
ties, and " is the error term. For ease of interpretation of the coe¢ cients,
A and C are both mean-centred. Our key parameter of interest is  , which
should be positive when altruism and condence in political parties are mu-
tually reinforcing, as our theory suggests. We perform a test whether  = 0
8In some countries, not-for-prot organizations are highly subsidized and under control
of the public sector. In others, not-for-prot organizations are much more autonomous
and sometimes function as a substitute for public goods provision by the government.
9Countries included in the analysis are: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mol-
dava, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slove-
nia, South Africa, South Korea, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Viet-
nam, and Zambia.
10We prefer binary logistic regression over probit regression because it simplies the
interpretation of results. Running the analysis with binary logistic regression gives a
slightly better t than probit (based on McFadden R2).
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against the one sided alternative that it is positive. Our theory provides little
guidance regarding the signs of  and . However, following prediction 1, the
sum of  and  should be positive for su¢ ciently high values of C. Likewise,
following prediction 2, the sum of  and  should be positive for su¢ ciently
high values of A. We shall test these predictions by computing the marginal
e¤ects and the corresponding standard errors for all possible values of A and
C.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample.11 Both altruism and
condence in political parties are slightly higher among public sector workers
as compared to private sector workers. This can also be seen in Figures 2 and
3. There are some remarkable di¤erences in demographics between public and
private sector workers. Public sector workers are more likely female, higher
educated, and slightly older as compared to private sector workers. In the
empirical analysis we shall control for these di¤erences in observables.
5 Results
Table 2 shows the results of the binary logistic regressions for the full sample
of workers. We report both the regression estimates b and the exponent of the
regression estimates exp(b). The exponent of the regression estimate minus
one gives the estimated marginal change in odds given a unit change in the
independent variable. Following most previous studies, our rst estimation
includes only altruism as explanatory variable. Clearly, workers with higher
levels of altruism are more likely to be employed in the public sector. This
e¤ect is both economically and statistically signicant. A marginal increase
by one from the mean of the altruism variable results in 8% higher odds of
working in the public sector instead of the private sector.12 This implies a
substantial di¤erence in the odds of working in the public sector instead of
the private sector of 47% (1:0805 = 1: 469 ) between the least altruistic people
and the most altruistic people in our sample. This result is well in line with
the earlier empirical studies discussed in section 2.
Next we control for demographic characteristics and country dummies.
The e¤ect of altruism is robust in sign and signicance; the marginal e¤ect
11Compared to the original data, scales of altruism and condence in political parties
are reversed for interpretational purposes.
12We also tested for nonlinear e¤ects of altruism, but these turn out to be insignicant
and add little explanatory power.
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of altruism decreases from 8% to 7%, but remains highly signicant. We
nd strong evidence for the inuence of the demographic control variables
on sector choice. Consistent with earlier studies (e.g. Lewis and Frank 2002,
Buurman et al. 2009), we nd that the likelihood of being employed in the
public sector is higher for females and increases with age and education.13
The country dummies, which control for unobserved di¤erences across coun-
tries, are jointly highly signicant (p < 0:01).
Column 3 of Table 2 includes condence in political parties and the in-
teraction with altruism as explanatory variables. The conditional marginal
e¤ect of altruism remains economically and statistically signicant. The mar-
ginal e¤ect of altruism is 6,4%, given average condence in political parties.
The control variables remain signicant with similar magnitudes and signs
as compared to the second estimation. The marginal e¤ect of condence in
political parties conditional on average altruism is also signicant and posi-
tive; an increase of condence in political parties results in 9,4% higher odds
to work in the public sector instead of the private sector. We nd evidence
in support of our key prediction, the one-sided test for a positive interac-
tion e¤ect between altruism and condence in political parties is signicant
(p = 0:066). A unit increase of condence in political parties leads to an
additional marginal e¤ect of altruism of 2,4%. Table 3 shows in more de-
tail how the marginal e¤ect of altruism changes with condence in political
parties, and also how the marginal e¤ect of condence in political parties
changes with altruism. Well in line with our predictions, the marginal e¤ect
of a workers altruism is strongly increasing in the workers condence in po-
litical parties. Similarly, we nd no signicant marginal e¤ect of condence
in political parties for low values of altruism and positive and signicant ef-
fects for high values. In contrast to our predictions, we do not nd negative
marginal e¤ects of altruism and condence at the lower ends of the scales.
As discussed in the previous section, this may well be due to the fact that
we cannot distinguish spiteful workers and workers with conicting mission
preferences from workers with a more neutral stance.
Figure 4 depicts for each possible combination of altruism and condence
in political parties, the estimated di¤erence in odds (and its 95% condence
interval in transparent planes) to work in the public sector as compared to
people with average altruism and condence in political parties. Clearly,
13Wald tests show that the educational dummies di¤er signicantly from each other
(p < 0:01; level 5 and 6 at p < 0:10).
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highly altruistic workers with strong condence in political parties are very
likely to work in the public sector, with a positive and signicant total ef-
fect of up to 37% on the odds as compared to the average worker. In con-
trast, a non-altruistic worker with weak condence shows a signicant lower
likelihood of working in the public sector (total e¤ect up to  21% on the
odds). Altruistic workers with weak condence and non-altruistic workers
with strong condence are not signicantly more or less likely to work in the
public sector.
Previous research has shown that public service motivation is a more im-
portant determinant of sector of employment for higher educated workers
(Lewis and Frank 2002). To assess di¤erences between education levels in
our sample, we estimate equation (1) for three subsamples: a low, interme-
diate, and high level of education.14 Table 4 reports the estimation results
for these subsamples. Well in line with Lewis and Frank (2002), we nd rela-
tively weak e¤ects for workers with low and intermediate education, while for
highly educated workers we nd very strong e¤ects on sector of employment
of altruism, condence in political parties, and, in particular, for the inter-
action between these two. The coe¢ cient for the interaction term is more
than three times as large as compared to the regression using the full sample
and highly signicant (p < 0:01). Our hypothesis that altruism and mis-
sion alignment are mutually reinforcing thus nds strong support among the
highly educated workers. Table 5 reports the corresponding marginal e¤ects
for the subsample of highly educated workers. In line with our predictions,
we nd no signicant marginal e¤ect of altruism for low values of condence
in political parties, while the marginal e¤ect is positive and highly signi-
cant for high values of condence. Likewise, we nd a positive and signicant
marginal e¤ect of condence in political parties on public sector employment
for highly altruistic workers. For the middle altruism categories, we nd no
signicant marginal e¤ect of condence. Lastly, for the lowest altruism cate-
gory, we nd a sizeable but insignicant negative marginal e¤ect (p = 0:11).
While remarkable, this is fully consistent with our model if many of the
people in the lowest altruism category are spiteful.
Figure 5 plots the estimated di¤erence in odds to work in the public sector
14The low subsample includes all workers who have less than secondary education (cate-
gories 1 to 4 in the dataset), the intermediate subsample includes all workers with at least
secondary education and at most university prepatory (categories 5 to 7), and the high
subsample includes all workers with more than university prepatory education (category
8 and 9).
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for the subsample of highly educated workers. Highly educated workers with
high altruism and strong condence in political parties face up to 71% higher
odds of working in the public sector as compared to the average worker.
Highly altruistic workers with weak condence and non-altruistic workers
with strong condence show a signicant lower likelihood of working in the
public sector. All three ndings are consistent with our model, with the
latter two indicative of conict of mission preferences and spite among the
highly educated workforce, respectively.
6 Conclusion
We have studied how a workers altruism and mission preferences jointly af-
fect his likelihood of working in the public sector rather than taking a job
in the private sector. We built a very simple model that predicts that al-
truism and alignment of mission preferences with the mission of the public
sector are mutually reinforcing forces. Simply put, our theory predicts that
alignment of mission preferences matters more when a workers altruism is
higher and that altruism matters more when mission preferences are more
closely aligned. We have tested these predictions using data from the World
Values Survey, containing data on over 30.000 workers, covering their sector
of employment, their willingness to help other people (altruism), and their
condence in political parties (which we take as a proxy for alignment with
the public sectors mission). We nd strong evidence for a mutually rein-
forcing role of altruism and mission alignment, particularly among highly
educated workers. Our results show that only those workers who are highly
altruistic as well as have strong condence in political parties have a signif-
icantly higher likelihood of working in the public sector, while workers with
low altruism and weak condence are signicantly less likely to work in the
public sector. The size of these e¤ects is substantial. Highly altruistic work-
ers with weak condence and non-altruistic workers with strong condence
are neither more nor less likely to sort to the public sector in the full sample.
Among highly educated workers, the latter two groups have a signicantly
lower likelihood of working in the public sector. These results indicate that
conict of mission preferences and spite discourages some highly educated
workers to sort into the public sector.
A caveat of our analysis (that we share with most previous studies) is
that we cannot distinguish whether our results originate from (self-)selection
13
of workers or from preference adaptation (see Wright and Grant 2010 for an
interesting discussion of this issue). For instance, we cannot rule out that the
patterns that we nd in our data are non-existent for workers who just started
their career and so entirely arise from adaption of preferences since workers
have started a job in a particular sector. Following this interpretation of our
results, employees acquire higher condence in political parties and become
more altruistic when working in the public sector. While this interpretation
may have some intuitive appeal, the available empirical evidence points in
the opposite direction for public sector workers altruism. That is, when
tenure increases, workers in the public sector tend to experience a decrease
rather than an increase in altruistic motivations (see Blau 1960, Van Maanen
1975, Moynihan and Pandey 2007, De Cooman et al. 2009, and Buurman
et al. 2009). Future research should provide insight into whether the same
holds for condence in political parties.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
obs. Public Private Total
Altruism 30652
Mean 4.78 4.68 4.71
Standard deviation (1.08) (1.11) (1.11)
Confidence in Political Parties 28429
Mean 2.09 2.03 2.05
Standard deviation (0.82) (0.80) (0.81)
Gender: % Female 30463
Mean 0.49 0.39 0.42
Standard deviation (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Age: Years 30463
Mean 40.49 38.45 39.05
Standard deviation (11.33) (12.34) (12.08)
Education: % Level 30463
None 0.01 0.07 0.05
Incomplete Primary 0.02 0.05 0.04
Primary 0.05 0.12 0.10
Incomplete Secondary 0.05 0.07 0.06
Secondary 0.22 0.22 0.22
Incomplete University Preparatory 0.05 0.06 0.06
University Preparatory 0.17 0.17 0.17
University: no degree 0.10 0.07 0.08
University 0.34 0.15 0.21
Countries 50
Observations 9002 21650 30652
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Table 2: Results of the binary logistic regression (full sample)
b Exp(b) b Exp(b) b Exp(b)
Altruism 0.077 *** 1.080 0.068 *** 1.070 0.062 *** 1.064
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Female 0.476 *** 1.609 0.457 *** 1.579
(0.028) (0.029)
Age 0.100 *** 1.105 0.094 *** 1.099
(0.007) (0.007)
Age² -0.001 *** 0.999 -0.001 *** 0.999
(0.000) (0.000)
Education=2 0.626 *** 1.870 0.752 *** 2.121
(0.139) (0.160)
Education=3 1.092 *** 2.980 1.183 *** 3.264
(0.120) (0.141)
Education=4 1.526 *** 4.600 1.639 *** 5.150
(0.125) (0.144)
Education=5 2.033 *** 7.637 2.142 *** 8.516
(0.115) (0.136)
Education=6 1.921 *** 6.828 1.957 *** 7.078
(0.124) (0.145)
Education=7 2.167 *** 8.732 2.249 *** 9.478
(0.115) (0.137)
Education=8 2.416 *** 11.201 2.517 *** 12.391
(0.120) (0.141)
Education=9 2.946 *** 19.030 3.074 *** 21.628
(0.115) (0.136)
Confidence 0.090 *** 1.094
(0.019)
Confidence*Altruism 0.024 * 1.024
(0.016)
Intercept -0.879 *** 0.415 -5.605 *** 0.004 -5.534 *** 0.004
(0.013) (0.215) (0.230)
Country Dummies No Yes Yes
Observations Dep=0 21650 21537 20196
Observations Dep=1 9002 8926 8233
Total Observations 30652 30463 28429
McFadden R² 0.001 0.124 0.119
Log Likelihood -18535 -16149 -15068
Notes:  Standard errors between parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
Variables altruism and confidence are centered around their sample mean.
Dependent variable: sector of employment
(1) (2) (3)
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Table 3: Marginal e¤ects (full sample)
Confidence in political parties 1 2 3 4
dln(odds)/dAltruism 0.037* 0.061*** 0.085*** 0.109***
(0.021) (0.014) (0.021) (0.035)
Altruism 1 2 3 4 5 6
dln(odds)/dConfidence 0.001 0.025 0.049 0.073*** 0.097*** 0.121***
(0.064) (0.048) (0.034) (0.023) (0.019) (0.027)
Notes:  Standard errors between parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (based on Wald tests).
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Table 4: Results of regression with sample split on educational level
Group:
b Exp(b) b Exp(b) b Exp(b)
Altruism 0.056 1.058 0.047 ** 1.048 0.077 *** 1.080
(0.035) (0.020) (0.024)
Female 0.200 *** 1.221 0.364 *** 1.440 0.693 *** 2.000
(0.076) (0.043) (0.049)
Age 0.058 *** 1.060 0.087 *** 1.091 0.129 *** 1.138
(0.017) (0.011) (0.014)
Age² 0.000 ** 1.000 -0.001 *** 0.999 -0.001 *** 0.999
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education=2 0.391 ** 1.478
(0.173)
Education=3 0.576 *** 1.779
(0.158)
Education=4 0.982 *** 2.670
(0.166)
Education=5
Education=6 -0.213 *** 0.808
(0.076)
Education=7 0.140 *** 1.150
(0.050)
Education=8
Education=9 0.585 *** 1.795
(0.058)
Confidence 0.079 * 1.082 0.104 *** 1.110 0.114 *** 1.121
(0.047) (0.028) (0.034)
Confidence*Altruism -0.012 0.989 -0.002 0.998 0.081 *** 1.084
(0.037) (0.023) (0.029)
Intercept -3.820 *** 0.022 -3.437 *** 0.032 -3.894 *** 0.020
(0.408) (0.328) (0.327)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations Dep=0 6115 9357 4724
Observations Dep=1 1004 3598 3631
Total Observations 7119 12955 8355
McFadden R² 0.126 0.083 0.087
Log Likelihood -2531 -7020 -5220
Notes:  Standard errors between parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
Variables altruism and confidence are centered around their sample mean.
Dependent variable: sector of employment
Low Intermediate High
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Table 5: Marginal e¤ects (high education subsample)
Confidence in political parties 1 2 3 4
dln(odds)/dAltruism -0.005 0.076*** 0.157*** 0.238***
(0.037) (0.024) (0.037) (0.063)
Altruism 1 2 3 4 5 6
dln(odds)/dConfidence -0.185 -0.104 -0.024 0.057 0.138*** 0.219***
(0.114) (0.087) (0.062) (0.041) (0.034) (0.049)
Notes:  Standard errors between parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at respectively 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (based on Wald tests).
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Figures
Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of working in the public sector
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Figure 2: Density of altruism
26
Figure 3: Density of condence in political parties
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Figure 4: Total e¤ect on the odds of working in the public sector of altruism
and condence in political parties (full sample)
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Figure 5: Total e¤ect on the odds of working in the public sector of altruism
and condence in political parties (high education subsample)
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